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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite general advancements in the status of women in recent decades, women still 
experience unequal access to the workforce in most countries, in part due to their 
caregiving responsibilities. This thesis analyzes the effects of different social services on 
women’s employment in all developed OECD countries, as well as the effect of women’s 
employment on the economy in these same countries. Then this thesis examines pro-
female-employment policies in case studies on Ireland, France, and Sweden to determine 
the most effective means of promoting women’s employment.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Over time and within different cultures, the status of women has varied greatly, 
though in almost all circumstances it was generally below that of men. The widespread 
belief that women and men deserve equal treatment, even under the law, is still a 
relatively new development birthed primarily by the suffragette movement of the late 
19th and early 20th centuries along with the second-wave feminism of the 1960s-80s. 
Today, the world is experiencing a third-wave of feminism, and like its predecessors, this 
movement is certainly considered divisive. Feminism and feminist policies remain hotly 
debated topics, with one of the most oft-discussed topics being whether or not there is 
still a need for feminism in our modern world, with some believing that equality between 
the sexes has already been achieved.  
 Economic equality is one of the major topics of the day, with the wage gap 
between men and women frequently being a topic of debate and discussion. One factor 
that majorly impacts differences in earnings between men and women is the employment 
gap – a discrepancy between not only the rates at which men and women work but also 
between the quality of their respective employment. In most countries, women still work 
at a lower rate than men and are employed part-time at a much higher rate as well. This is 
often attributed to the fact that women have caregiving obligations to fulfill, leaving them 
unable to pursue full-time employment or any employment at all.  
During the period of second-wave feminism, there was a push both from rights 
activist groups and even from progressive economists for countries to implement 
programs that would allow a greater number of women to enter into the workforce, 
specifically by creating and implementing programs that removed some of the financial 
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burden and time requirements associated with caregiving. How effective are these 
programs, and do they still continue to have a positive impact on women’s employment 
to this day? Most importantly, is there still room for improve to further close the gender 
gap? 
Research Question and Hypothesis 
My thesis seeks to examine firstly the relationship between governmental 
programs and social services such as maternity leave, elderly care, and familial care and 
female employment, and secondly the relationship between female employment and the 
overall success of an economy. Many women feel forced to choose between their roles as 
mothers and/or caregivers to the elderly and their careers due to the high costs associated 
with hiring external caregivers. While there were many studies of this kind in the 1990s 
after the push for feminist policy that occurred in the 1980s, there is a lack of 
examination as to whether these policies continue to have such an impact on female 
employment years after women’s emancipation from the home. My thesis seeks to 
examine if countries are still receiving a “return on investment” so to speak when they 
choose to invest in social programs that encourage women’s employment.  
I will examine if factors such as expenditure on children, expenditure on the 
elderly, and state-mandated maternity leave continue to affect the rate of female 
employment as compared to that of male employment. Then I will assess if countries 
with more equalized rates of female and male employment demonstrate better 
functioning economies, primarily by comparing real GDP growth rates. My hypothesis is 
that nations with programs to eliminate or ameliorate factors that commonly bar women 
from entering the workforce will have a higher rate of female employment, and that 
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countries with a higher rate of female employment will demonstrate more successful 
economies. I believe that this research is important because social expectations that 
women are meant to be caregivers — and the often-high costs of hiring alternative 
caregivers — can be such a limiting factor for women who wish to pursue careers. 
Therefore, I believe that it is important to demonstrate that a country can benefit from 
ameliorating these costs, thereby allowing more women to enter into the workforce. 
 The second chapter of my thesis will be a case study of three different countries, 
each representing one of the three major welfare regimes: liberal, corporatist, and social-
democratic. This chapter aims to examine more specific factors and their impact on 
women’s employment as well as other indicators of women’s’ work-life balance. This 
includes metrics such as hours spent in formal childcare, reasons for part-time 
employment, reasons for labor market inactivity, and pension systems.  
Literature Review 
Esping-Andersen, Gallie, Hemerijck, and Myles argue that greater employment of 
women leads to higher achieving economies and that, therefore, welfare states should 
adopt a “life course perspective” in implementing programs to care for the young and the 
elderly, as women are often the ones who must forgo working to care for these groups.1 
This is the basic theory that provides the foundation for the two research questions of this 
thesis. 
Esping-Andersen, known for his decommodification theory, also discusses de-
familialization as the factor by which women are able to become “commodified.” 
                                                
1 Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Duncan Gallie, Anton Hemerijck, and John Myles, “A New Welfare 
Architecture for Europe? Report submitted to the Belgian Presidency of the European Union,” September 
2001. 
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According to Esping-Andersen, a “de-familializing regime is one which seeks to 
unburden the household and diminish individuals' welfare dependence on kinship”2 
which also serves to decrease the amount of time that women must devote to unpaid care 
work. He also found that familialism is counter-productive to both family formation and 
the labor supply, resulting in low fertility rates, lower household incomes, and higher 
poverty risks. He concludes that “above all, familialism has become the Achilles' heel of 
the welfare state itself” because “lower levels of paid female employment mean also a 
smaller tax base; and low fertility now threatens the basic financial viability of welfare 
states in the future.”3 
Several other researchers have discussed the positive effect that supporting 
women’s employment has on the economy. A May 1999 paper published by the World 
Bank entitled “Gender Inequality, Income, and Growth: Are Good Times Good for 
Women?” succinctly summaries its findings in the following manner:  
These systematic patterns in gender differentials suggest that low investment in 
women is not an efficient economic choice, and we can show that gender 
inequality in education is bad for economic growth. Thus, societies that have a 
preference for not investing in girls pay a price for it in terms of slower growth 
and reduced income.4 
Though they are not looking at gender roles, they are examining gender inequality which 
is often associated with societies in which women are expected to play a more traditional 
                                                
2 Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Social Foundations of Post-Industrial Economies, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 51. 
3 Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Social Foundations of Post-Industrial Economies, 70. 
4 David Dollar and Roberta Gatti, “Gender Inequality, Income, and Growth: Are Good Times Good for 
Women?” (Policy Research Report on Gender and Development, Working Paper Series, No. 1. 1999), 1. 
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role. The metrics that they used to judge the level of gender equality were as follows: 
access to and achievement in education (particularly in secondary education); measures 
of female empowerment, including the percentage of women in parliament and the year 
that women gained the right to vote; improvements in health according to gender-specific 
life expectancies; and indicators of legal and economic equality for women in both 
marriage and society. They found all measures of gender equality to share a positive 
correlation with per capita income.5 
Another study by Stephan Klasen and Francesca Lamanna found that “gender 
gaps in education and employment considerably reduce economic growth.”6 They based 
their theory on that fact that while gender inequality in education is likely to have a direct 
impact on economic growth, “gender inequality may also affect economic growth 
through its effects on investment rates, overall population, growth, and growth in the 
working-age population.”7 Their overall conclusion was that discrimination toward 
women in both education and employment is both harmful to the women in question and 
also imposes a cost on the entire society, even using the phrase “the challenge of 
increasing the economic growth of a country is…to a considerable extent linked to the 
role played by women in the society.”8  
A study by Agénor and Canuto similarly found that gender policies would 
eventually produce beneficial economic results, but only in the long-run, meaning that 
poor countries may struggle to fund this type of projects that have such a slow rate of 
                                                
5 Ibid., 4-5. 
6 Stephen Klasen and Francesca Lamanna, “The Impact of Gender Inequality in Education and 
Employment on Economic Growth: New Evidence for a Panel of Countries,” (Feminist Economics 15 (3), 
July 2009, 91–132. 2007), 91. 
7 Ibid., 103. 
8 Klasen and Lamanna, 117. 
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return on investments.9 Galor and Weil asserted that there exists a “positive feedback 
loop [that] generates a demographic transition: a rapid decline in fertility accompanied by 
accelerated output growth.”10 Essentially, an increase in capital per worker results in an 
increase in women's relative wages. Likewise, an increase in women's relative wages 
reduces fertility rates which in turn raises the level of capital per worker.  
In “Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis of 
Gender Relations and Welfare States,” Ann Shola Orloff discusses how much of the 
research and theoretical work surrounding welfare has failed to adequately account for 
gender differences and relations within welfare states. Within this article, she develops a 
modified framework based upon that used by power resource analysts for analyzing 
variations between states’ social provision that accounts for gender. She also suggests 
two new dimensions for analysis: “access to paid work” and “women's capacity to form 
and maintain autonomous households.” My thesis focuses upon the dimension of “access 
to paid work,” a “potentially emancipatory” factor for women in that it “provides 
independence and enhanced leverage within marriage and the patriarchal family.”11 A 
woman’s economic dependence within a marriage creates a potentially harmful power 
dynamic, therefore “access to paid work and to the services that make employment a 
viable option for mothers (or other caretakers)” is an incredibly important dimension of 
the welfare state which is often overlooked by mainstream comparative researchers.12
 
                                                
9 Pierre-Richard Agénor and Otaviano Canuto, “Gender equality and economic growth: A framework for 
policy analysis,” 2013. 
10 O. Galor and Weil, D., “The gender gap, fertility and growth,” American Economic Review, 86. 374-87. 
1996. 
11 Ann Shola Orloff, “Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: The Comparative Analysis of Gender 
Relations and Welfare States,” American Sociological Review 58:3 (June 1993): 318. 
12 Ibid. 
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In “Welfare Regimes, Family- Supportive Policies, and Women’s Employment 
along the Life- Course,” authors Stier, Lewin-Epstein, and Braun perform a cross-
national analysis of women’s employment patterns during their child-rearing years and 
the consequences of these patterns on their earnings later in life. They identified “five 
meaningful employment patterns: continuous full-time employment, shift from part-time 
to full-time, continuous part-time employment, a shift from no employment to part-time 
employment, and continuous nonemployment.”13 While they did not find the relationship 
between employment-supportive policies and employment patterns to be “straight-
forward,” they did find that countries with less-supportive policies seemed to promote a 
greater heterogeneity between women’s employment patterns (with women often either 
in continuous full-time employment or continuous nonemployment) while those with 
more-supportive policies showcased a greater homogeneity (most women worked part-
time when they were raising children or shifted during their life from one form of 
employment to another).14 They also found that “when employment policies are aimed to 
encourage mothers’ participation in paid employment, low costs or even no costs are 
associated with deviations from continuous full-time employment,” but in countries with 
less support for women’s employment, there are often penalties associated with 
interruptions in workforce participation or transitioning to long-term part-time 
                                                
13 Haya Stier, Noah Lewin- Epstein, and Michael Braun, “Welfare Regimes, Family- Supportive Policies, 
and Women’s Employment along the Life- Course,” American Journal of Sociology 106:6 (May 2001): 
1746. 
14 Haya Stier, Noah Lewin- Epstein, and Michael Braun, “Welfare Regimes, Family- Supportive Policies, 
and Women’s Employment along the Life- Course,” American Journal of Sociology 106:6 (May 2001): 
1747-48. 
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employment.15 This seems to indicate that employment supportive policies are in fact 
offering women the freedom to choose their employment patterns due to a greater sense 
of security and a lower risk of penalty. 
Anton Hemerijck refers to the ability to reconcile women’s desires to both build a 
career and form a family as the “litmus test for future welfare state success.”16 According 
to him, in order to pass this “litmus” test and ensure the future health of the welfare state, 
affordable childcare is an absolutely necessary dimension of social policy. We Need a 
New Welfare State claims that the “financial viability of the welfare state in the twenty-
first century depends critically on both the revenues generated by high levels of women’s 
labor force participation, on the one hand, and their willingness to reproduce the next 
generation, on the other.”17 The danger of not socializing familial care is that women will 
be forced to choose between motherhood and a career. As an increasing number of 
women desire emancipation from the home and their own level of financial 
independence, this could lead to decreasing birth rates and demographic aging. A birth 
rate below population replacement levels endangers the entirety of the welfare state – 
particularly pensions and healthcare – because the financial burden on those who are of 
working age will continue to increase to the point of unsustainability.18 
An important factor in determining a woman’s perceived ability to reconcile 
motherhood and employment is the presence of maternity and parental leave policies, 
                                                
15 Haya Stier, Noah Lewin- Epstein, and Michael Braun, “Welfare Regimes, Family- Supportive Policies, 
and Women’s Employment along the Life- Course,” American Journal of Sociology 106:6 (May 2001): 
1756. 
16 Anton Hemerijck, Changing Welfare States, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 135. 
17 Esping-Andersen et al. 160 
18 T. Dang, P. Antolin, and H. Oxley, “Fiscal Implication of Ageing: Projections of Age-Related 
Spending,” OECD Working Paper 305, 2001.  
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though the actual benefit of these policies is debated. There are two primary, and 
opposing, schools of thought surrounding maternity leave and female employment. The 
first is that maternity leave legislation leads to a decrease in women’s employment and/or 
wages because employers become increasingly hesitant to hire women as these 
requirements lead to a potential increase in the costs to employ women, particularly 
women in their prime childbearing years. For example, Robert P. Murphy argues that 
government mandated maternity leave (particularly paid maternity leave) will reduce 
hiring opportunities and wages for women, and that companies should instead be able to 
adopt these policies voluntarily. It is his belief that most companies will be willing to 
adopt some form of parental leave if it makes them more attractive to well-qualified 
prospective employees. His argument is more based upon assumptions of how companies 
will react to maternity policies than concrete evidence and examples of how most 
companies have reacted in the past.19 
The second belief is that maternity leave legislation leads to an increase in 
women’s employment, at least partially because women perceive themselves as being 
better able to balance motherhood and a career and thus enter the workforce at a higher 
rate. This belief appears to be supported by more scholarly literature and research than 
the former. Therefore, this thesis favors this theory, and thus believes that an increase in 
maternity leave will correlate with an increase in female employment. Christopher J. 
Ruhm found in his 1998 study on the economic consequences of parental leave mandates 
within Europe that “rights to paid leave are found to raise the percentage of women 
employed, with a substantial effect observed for even short durations of guaranteed work 
                                                
19 Robert P. Murphy, “‘Paid Family Leave’ Is a Great Way to Hurt Women,” Foundation for Economic 
Education, https://fee.org/articles/paid-family-leave-is-a-great-way-to-hurt-women/, (June 2, 2015). 
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absence.”20 At this time of this study, all Western European countries required three 
months of paid maternity benefits at minimum.21  
Methodology 
The countries that I have examined are the countries within the 36 OECD Council 
member countries which are classified by the United Nations as developed countries. 
Only developed countries have been assessed as developing countries often show higher 
GDP growth rates, which could interfere with the validity of correlations. Therefore, I 
will be examining 32 countries in total as Chile, Israel, Turkey, and Mexico have been 
excluded. The variety of countries present in this council allowed for a more 
representative sample of nations, while their membership will insure a greater availability 
and consistency of data. The chronology of this data was determined simply by the 
greatest overlapping range between the different variables studied that fell within the 
years I was seeking to examine. 
My independent variables to determine if nations with programs to eliminate or 
ameliorate factors that commonly bar women from entering the workforce will have a 
higher rate of female employment are length of paid maternity and parental leave to 
mothers in weeks, total public expenditure on families as a percent of GDP, and pension 
expenditure. The dependent variable for this question will be the difference between men 
and women’s employment,22 and the control variables for this question are level of 
development23 and total public social expenditure as a percent of GDP. 
                                                
20 Christopher J. Ruhm, “The Economic Consequences of Parental Leave Mandates: Lessons from Europe,” 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 113 (1998): 285-317.   
21 Ibid.  
22 Employment here being defined as the employment to population ratio for those aged 15 to 64. 
23 As assigned by the United Nations. 
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My independent variable to answer the question of whether countries with more 
equalized rates of female and male employment demonstrate better functioning 
economies is the difference between men and women’s employment24 and my dependent 
variable will be annual GDP growth rates. This question seeks to answer whether 
countries receive a return on investment, so to speak, when they implement programs that 
allow women greater access to the workforce, but in no way do the results of this specific 
analysis impact the results pertaining to the question of whether certain social programs 
impact women’s employment. This data will simply determine if there is an economic 
incentive to support women’s employment, in addition to the pre-existing moral motives 
and social benefits. 
 
  
                                                
24 Same definition of employment as above. 
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CHAPTER I: CROSS-NATIONAL QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Despite major advancements in the past century, and even within the past few 
decades, women’s employment still famously lags behind that of men, both in the form of 
a gender employment gap and a gender pay gap. The second-wave feminism of the 
1960s-80s led to both an increase of women in the workplace, and in many countries, an 
increased demand for social services which affected women’s access to employment. The 
positive effects of these social services on women’s employment in the time immediately 
following their implementation has already been well-documented, but the question 
remains of whether or not we could still go further in order to continue to close this 
employment gap. Of course, there is an intrinsic social value in reducing these two gaps, 
but is there also an economic incentive which could promote governmental action? Do 
nations with programs to eliminate or ameliorate factors that still commonly bar women 
from entering the workforce demonstrate a higher rate of female employment? And do 
countries with a higher rate of female employment demonstrate more successful 
economies?  
Though there are a multitude of factors that may hinder women’s entrance into 
the workforce – such as sexism, less access to higher education, etc. – the factors that this 
thesis aims to examine relate specifically to women’s roles as caregivers.  As previously 
mentioned in the introduction, many women feel forced to choose between their roles as 
mothers and/or caregivers to the elderly and their careers due to the time demands that 
accompany these roles, the high costs associated with hiring external caregivers, etc. The 
variables chosen for this cross-national analysis reflect programs – such as state-
mandated maternity leave, expenditure on families, and expenditure on the elderly – that 
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can mitigate the pressures placed on women to forgo employment in order to perform a 
caregiving role. Whether or not these social programs have an indirect impact on 
economic growth can be seen by examining the relationship between the gender 
employment gap and the GDP growth rate. Because I wish to examine whether or not 
these programs show an ongoing “return-on-investment,” the oldest data examined will 
be from 1990, but the bulk of the data will come from 2000 onward.   
The countries whose data I will be examining will be those of the 36 OECD 
Council member countries which are classified by the United Nations as developed 
countries. Therefore, the countries that I will be examining are as follows: Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States – 32 countries in total. Chile, Israel, Turkey, and Mexico are not included 
as they are considered economies in transition. The use of developed countries within the 
OECD provides a consistent body of data pertaining to social programs, women’s 
employment, and economic growth while avoiding any confounding variables related to 
economic growth. Economies in transition introduce too many confounding variables for 
multiple reasons. First of all, since growth rates are typically higher in economies in 
transition, including these countries could potentially influence the correlation between 
the employment gap and economic growth, which is used as a metric for economic 
success within this thesis. Level of development is also often an indicator of social 
progress, meaning that economies in transition are much more likely to implement fewer 
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policies which increase women’s access to the workforce, thereby causing them to have a 
wider employment gap. Therefore, due to factors for which it is challenging to control, 
this wider employment gap combined with a higher economic growth rate would return 
the opposite of the hypothesized result. 
Social Services and Women’s Employment 
I begin by examining the relationship between my independent variables – social 
programs such as the length of paid maternity and parental leave to mothers in weeks, 
total public expenditure on families as a percent of GDP, and total public expenditure in 
cash benefits to old age and survivors as a percentage of GDP – and the dependent 
variable – the difference between the male employment to population ratio and the 
female employment to population ratio. The control variables for this question are total 
public social expenditure as a percent of GDP and level of development as assigned by 
the United Nations.  
The first independent variable is the length of paid maternity and parental leave to 
mothers in weeks. This variable was chosen to represent a social institution which allows 
women to pursue motherhood without feeling as though their careers are at stake. The 
next independent variable – total public expenditure on families as a percent of GDP – 
was selected to represent a social program that decreases the pressure on women to 
choose between motherhood and the labor force. While it seems plausible that public 
expenditure on families would lessen the need for women to work, therefore decreasing 
the number of women in the workforce, I hypothesize that the number of women in the 
workforce will increase with rising public expenditure on families. The data for this 
variable includes tax breaks for families, cash benefits, and family services. While tax 
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breaks and cash benefits such as child allowances might decrease the financial need for a 
mother to work, public family services – which include “the direct financing or 
subsidisation of childcare and early childhood education facilities, public childcare 
support through earmarked payments to parents, … and public spending on family 
services, including centre-based facilities and home help services for families in need” – 
are likely to allow women the freedom to enter the workforce.25  
Total public expenditure in cash benefits to old age and survivors as a percentage 
of GDP was chosen as the final independent variable to answer this research question. 
This variable was chosen to represent a social service that lessens the burden upon 
women to act as caregivers to the elderly. For those classified under “old age,” this data 
includes expenditure on pensions, early retirement pensions, and home-help/residential 
services while for those classified as survivors, expenditure includes pensions and any 
assistance with funeral payments. My hypothesis is that an increase in this form of public 
expenditure will lead to an increase in female employment, mostly because home-help 
services remove some of the burden on women to be caregivers for their elderly family 
but also because increased pensions allow for the elderly to have greater financial 
independence. In the United States, where women account for almost three-quarters of 
informal caregivers,26 McLanahan and Monson discovered that caregiving both lowered a 
woman’s chances for employment and the number of hours women who were employed 
                                                
25 OECD, PF1.1: “Public spending on family benefits,” 
http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/PF1_1_Public_spending_on_family_benefits.pdf, accessed on: 12 January 
2019. 
26 Susan L. Ettner, "The Impact of "Parent Care" on Female Labor Supply Decisions," Demography 32, no. 
1 (1995): 64. 
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were able to work.27 Therefore, it is plausible that there will not be a particularly large 
correlation between public expenditure in cash benefits to the elderly and women’s 
employment because many caregivers choose to enter part-time employment instead of 
exiting the workforce completely. 
Both the separate and cumulative effects of each of these variables on the 
dependent variable (i.e., the difference between the male employment to population ratio 
and the female employment to population ratio in those aged 15 to 64) must be 
determined. The employment to population ratio was chosen for analysis as employment 
and unemployment rates typically only account for the “labor force,” meaning those who 
are either currently actively employed, who are on leave with a position to which they 
will return (such as those on maternity or sick leave) or who are actively seeking 
employment. Therefore, those who are unemployed and not seeking employment are 
unaccounted for. It stands to reason that in a country with low levels of employment 
supportive policies for women, many women would not be actively seeking out work, 
possibly because they would be unable to fulfill a dual role as a caregiver and an 
employee. The difference between the male and female rates is used as opposed to the 
overall female rate to control for differences between countries in the general 
employment rate, which can be caused by a multitude of economic factors not related to 
the purview of this thesis.  
The relationship between each independent variable and the employment gap is 
examined separately below before the cumulative effect of these programs is displayed. 
                                                
27 Chizuko Wakabayashi and Katharine M. Donato, "Does Caregiving Increase Poverty among Women in 
Later Life? Evidence from the Health and Retirement Survey," Journal of Health and Social Behavior 47, 
no. 3 (2006): 259.  
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Each relationship is displayed graphically, and the R-squared values from each analysis 
are given as well. The R-squared values can range from -1.0 to 1.0, with values closer to 
either extreme indicating a stronger relationship. The P-values, which indicate whether 
the correlation between two variables can be considered statistically significant, are 
indicated on the table for each independent variable, with a P-value less than 0.05 being 
considered statistically significant for the purposes of this study.   
Each of the following graphs demonstrates the relationships and correlations 
between my independent variables and the female employment gap. There are three 
graphs for each independent variable. The first shows all developed OECD countries for 
which data was available all together on one graph, with each country being coded a 
different color. The second graph contains exactly the same data points as the first, but 
the data for each country is not differentiated. This allows for the observation of general 
trends over a cross-national time series. The final graph contains only the data for the 
countries who are members of the European Union, excluding Greece. Greece was not 
included simply because it is often a notable outlier among other EU data, possibly due to 
its volatile economy and unstable government. The goal of these final graphs is to view 
trends within the EU, so due to the fact that some of these graphs include data from the 
90s and early 2000s, all countries from the 2004 enlargement were not included. The 
countries added in the year 1995 were included, however, due to the fact that if a graph 
includes any data from before this year, it is solely from 1990. These sets of graphs each 
cover a different range of years, according to the availability of and overlap between the 
data pertaining to each variable. The years covered by each will be noted separately for 
each set of graphs.  
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An important thought to bear in mind regarding the following graphs is that low 
R-square values do not necessarily equate to a negligible correlation within this study. 
The female employment gap is an issue which is affected by so many different factors 
simultaneously, meaning that the odds of a perfect correlation are incredibly low. The 
goal is to determine if the trends do in fact move together in the expected directions, 
which are as follows: a negative correlation between length of maternity leave and the 
female employment gap, a negative correlation between expenditure on families and the 
female employment gap, and a negative correlation between expenditure on the elderly 
and the female employment gap. These findings would be considered in line with my 
hypothesis.  
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Maternity Leave 
 
Figure 1: Maternity Leave v. The Female Employment Gap – By Country28,29 
 
  
                                                
28 “Length of paid maternity and parental leave available to mothers in weeks.” OECD. Paris: Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
29 “Employment/population ratio, by sex and age group.” OECD. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development.  
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Figure 2: Maternity Leave v. The Female Employment Gap – Aggregate Data30, 31 
 
 
Figure 3: Maternity Leave v. The Female Employment Gap – Pre-2004 European Union, 
excluding Greece32,33 
 
  
                                                
30 “Length of paid maternity and parental leave available to mothers in weeks.” OECD. 
31 “Employment/population ratio, by sex and age group.” OECD. 
32 “Length of paid maternity and parental leave available to mothers in weeks.” OECD. 
33 “Employment/population ratio, by sex and age group.” OECD. 
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Table 1-1: The Effects of Maternity Leave on the Employment Gap between Men and 
Women 
Independent Variable  R-squared Value 
Maternity Leave — OECD Countries 0.018*** 
Maternity Leave — Pre-2004 EU 0.183*** 
*: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
 
Figures 1, 2, and 3 depict the relationship between the length of paid maternity 
and parental leave to mothers in weeks and the difference between the male and female 
employment/population ratio. All graphs contain statistically significant correlations 
according to their P-values. The years covered are 2000, 2005-2016, though there are 
missing values for several countries, as can readily be seen in Figure 1. It is also notable 
in Figure 1 that the countries with the most generous maternity leave policies appear to 
be mostly Eastern Europe and that the majority of those with the least supportive policies 
are not European. These two observations can at least partially account for the substantial 
difference between the R-squared values for the OECD aggregate data graph and the EU 
aggregate data graph, a difference of over 0.16. This indicates that more generous 
maternity leave policies are a greater predictor of women’s employment within the pre-
2004 European Union than without.  
 I theorize that the increase in this relationship is due largely to the absence of 
Hungary, Estonia, the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic in the second graph. All 
four of these countries had very long and generous maternity leave policies, yet their 
employment gap is not particularly low, especially when compared with the Nordic 
countries who also offer generous leave but frequently demonstrate an employment gap 
less than 5%.  
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Expenditure on Families  
 
Figure 4: Public Expenditure on Families v. The Female Employment Gap – By 
Country34,35 
 
  
                                                
34 “Total public social expenditure on families as a % of GDP.” OECD. Paris: Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development. 
35 “Employment/population ratio, by sex and age group.” OECD. 
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Figure 5: Public Expenditure on Families v. The Female Employment Gap – Aggregate 
Data36,37 
 
 
Figure 6: Public Expenditure on Families v. The Female Employment Gap – Pre-2004 
European Union, excluding Greece38,39 
 
                                                
36 “Total public social expenditure on families as a % of GDP.” OECD. 
37 “Employment/population ratio, by sex and age group.” OECD. 
38 “Total public social expenditure on families as a % of GDP.” OECD. 
39 “Employment/population ratio, by sex and age group.” OECD. 
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Table 1-2: The Effects of Expenditure on Family on the Employment Gap between Men 
and Women 
Independent Variable R-squared Value 
Expenditure on Families — OECD Countries 0.153*** 
Expenditure on Families — Pre-2004 EU 0.103*** 
*: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
 
Figures 4, 5, and 6 depict the relationship between total public expenditure on 
families as a percent of GDP and the difference between the male and female 
employment/population ratio. The years covered are 2005, 2007, 2009-2013, with a few 
gaps caused by a lack of data within certain countries on family expenditure, primarily in 
2005 and 2007. These graphs do not depict the countries of Greece, Latvia, and Lithuania 
as there was no available data for total public expenditure on families for these countries. 
These graphs demonstrate the opposite reaction to the removal of non-EU countries, with 
the R-squared value decreasing by over 0.05 between Figures 5 and 6. This indicates that 
there is less of a connection between expenditure on families and the employment gap in 
the countries who were members of the EU before 2004 than in the developed countries 
of the OECD. This is certainly less extreme than the difference between the r-squared 
values in the previous set of graphs, but it is still a discrepancy that is worth 
consideration.  
Perhaps this difference can be explained by differences in childcare between the 
two groups. In a comparative study of 30 European countries, the European Commission 
found that “the presence of a child has a small impact on male employment, but affects 
female employment rather heavily, especially in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
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Slovakia.”40 This might be due to the fact that those countries are among the most likely 
to not utilize formal childcare arrangements. In Slovakia, Lithuania, Austria, the Czech 
Republic and Poland, only 5% or less of children aged 0 to 2 are in formal childcare 
arrangements.41 Of these five countries, only Austria would be included in Figure 6. 
Many of the countries studied who demonstrated a low usage of formal childcare scored 
higher on other forms of childcare, such as using home-based caretakers (such as 
babysitters and nannies) or family/friends who acted as caretakers with notable 
exceptions being Latvia, Malta, Slovakia, Lithuania and the Czech Republic, who all 
scored below 25 % for both formal and informal arrangements. Four of these five 
countries would have been eliminated between Figure 5 and Figure 6. In countries where 
formal childcare arrangements are already highly used, public expenditure on families 
might not demonstrate as large of an effect on women’s employment.  
In general, this data does indicate at least a small connection between family 
expenditure and women’s employment. I believe that had there been OECD cross-
national data on public childcare expenditure specifically there would exist a much 
greater negative correlation between that and the employment gap.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
40 Janneke Plantenga and Chantal Remery, “The provision of childcare services: A comparative review of 
30 European countries,” European Commission (March 2009), 28.  
41 Ibid. 
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Expenditure on Old Age and Survivors 
 
Figure 7: Public Expenditure on Old Age and Survivors v. The Female Employment Gap 
– By Country42,43 
 
  
                                                
42 “Public expenditure on old-age and survivors cash benefits, in % GDP.” OECD. Paris: Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development. 
43 “Employment/population ratio, by sex and age group.” OECD. 
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Figure 8: Public Expenditure on Old Age and Survivors v. The Female Employment Gap 
– Aggregate Data44,45 
 
 
Figure 9: Public Expenditure on Old Age and Survivors v. The Female Employment Gap 
– Pre-2004 European Union, excluding Greece46,47 
  
                                                
44 “Public expenditure on old-age and survivors cash benefits, in % GDP.” OECD. 
45 “Employment/population ratio, by sex and age group.” OECD. 
46 “Public expenditure on old-age and survivors cash benefits, in % GDP.” OECD. 
47 “Employment/population ratio, by sex and age group.” OECD. 
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Table 1-3: The Effects of Expenditure on the Elderly on the Employment Gap  
Independent Variable R-squared Value 
Expenditure on Elderly — OECD Countries 0.002 
Expenditure on Elderly — Pre-2004 EU 0.002 
*: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
Figures 7, 8, and 9 depict the relationship between total public expenditure in cash 
benefits to old age and survivors as a percentage of GDP and the difference between the 
male and female employment/population ratio. The years covered are 1990, 1995, 2000, 
2005, 2010, 2015, and 2016, with surprisingly few gaps in available data.  
These graphs do seem to show a rather negligible amount of correlation as well as 
P-values which render them statistically negligible, an occurrence for which I posit a few 
possible theories. The first is that increased spending on the elderly might result from an 
increasingly old population, which often occurs due to a declining birth rate. Birth rates 
might be declining in these countries if they lack social programs that assist mothers 
because more women are choosing employment over having a large family or 
motherhood in general. If this was true, then there would be a positive correlation 
between expenditure on the elderly and female employment. 
The second is that increased spending on the elderly might result from an 
increasing number of families being unwilling to care for their elderly relatives, therefore 
leaving them dependent on the state and requiring the government to socialize the cost of 
this care. Of course, it is equally plausible that increased spending on the elderly might 
have led to less of a need for familial caregiving. Nevertheless, there is precedent for a 
lack of correlation between these two variables. In a study that took place four years after 
that of McLanahan and Monson, Moen, Robison, and Fields found that caregiving did not 
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affect women’s labor force participation because women were more likely to stop acting 
as caregivers than to leave the workforce.48 As social norms have changed, it is no longer 
as common for elderly relatives to move in with family when they become unable to care 
for themselves. According to the World Health Organization, the number of nursing and 
elderly home beds rose by over 200,000 in both Germany and France between 1999 and 
2011.49 While some families might shoulder the costs for these facilities, elderly persons 
who have no one to fund these living situations might account for a rise in expenditure on 
the elderly without necessarily simultaneously freeing women from a caregiving role. 
Table 1-4: Hypothesis 1 Regression Results 
variables  Coefficient 
estimate  
Standard 
error 
Coefficient 
estimate  
Standard 
error 
Coefficient 
estimate  
Standard 
error 
Coefficient 
estimate  
Standard 
error 
(Constant) 14.129*** (0.876) 19.433*** (1.601) 19.117*** (1.889) 26.277*** (2.044) 
Matern -0.025** (0.012) -0.010 (0.011) -0.011 (0.011) -0.024** (0.010) 
FamExp   -2.712*** (0.598) -2.725*** (0.603) 0.805 (0.804) 
OldAgeBene     0.042 (0.161) 1.435*** (0.279) 
TotSocExp       -1.223*** (0.213) 
R-square 0.037 0.204 0.205 0.415 
N 112 94 93 92 
*: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
Finally, the data must be considered simultaneously using linear regression to see 
how social programs overall impact women’s employment. All variables other than 
Expenditure on Families possess regression coefficients that are considered statistically 
                                                
48 Chizuko Wakabayashi and Katharine M. Donato, "Does Caregiving Increase Poverty among Women in 
Later Life? Evidence from the Health and Retirement Survey," Journal of Health and Social Behavior 47, 
no. 3 (2006): 259.  
49 “Number of nursing and elderly home beds,” European Health Information Gateway, 
Copenhagen:World Health Organization:Division of Information, Evidence, Research and Innovation. 
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significant. Controlling for all other variables, a one unit increase in EmployGap is 
associated with a 0.024 unit decrease in Matern, a 1.435 unit increase in OldAgeBene, 
and a 1.223 unit decrease in TotSocExp. Overall, the regression equation for the effects 
of social services on women’s employment is the following:  
EmployGap = 26.277 - 0.024*Matern + 0.805*FamExp + 1.435*OldAgeBene - 
1.223*TotSocExp 
The variables that are present in this equation are as follows:  
Independent Variables 
Matern Length of paid maternity and parental leave available to mothers in weeks 
FamExp Total public social expenditure on families as a % of GDP 
OldAgeBene Total public expenditure in cash benefits to old age and survivors as a % of GDP 
Dependent Variable 
EmployGap The difference between the employment/population ratio for males 15 to 64 and the employment/population ratio for females 15 to 64 
Control Variables 
TotSocExp Total public social expenditure as a % of GDP 
 
According to my hypothesis, this equation should read something akin to 
EmployGap = β0 - β1*[Matern] - β2*[FamExp] - β3*[OldAgeBene] - β4*[TotSocExp] 
because I hypothesized that all variables would have a negative correlation with the 
employment gap. Obviously, only maternity leave and total social expenditure followed 
this expectation. 
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Women’s Employment and Economic Performance  
My secondary research question asks if there is an economic incentive for 
governments to implement social services which allow women greater access to 
employment. The independent variable used to answer this question is the same as the 
dependent variable above: the difference between the male employment to population 
ratio and the female employment to population ratio. The dependent variable that was 
chosen to judge economic performance was the real GDP growth rate of each country 
from 1990 to 2015. This variable was chosen because it is frequently used as a metric to 
determine a country’s economic performance. My hypothesis is that the gap between 
male and female employment will show a negative correlation with a country’s GDP 
growth rate. 
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Figure 10: The Female Employment Gap v. GDP Growth Rate – By Country50,51 
 
  
                                                
50 “Employment/population ratio, by sex and age group.” OECD. 
51 “Gross domestic product (GDP), 2019 archive : GDP, volume – annual growth rates in percentage, 2019 
archive.” OECD. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
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Figure 11: The Female Employment Gap v. GDP Growth Rate – Aggregate Data52,53 
 
 
Figure 12: The Female Employment Gap v. GDP Growth Rate – Pre-2004 European 
Union, excluding Greece54,55 
 
                                                
52 “Employment/population ratio, by sex and age group.” OECD. 
53 “Gross domestic product (GDP), 2019 archive : GDP, volume – annual growth rates in percentage, 2019 
archive.” OECD. 
54 “Employment/population ratio, by sex and age group.” OECD. 
55 “Gross domestic product (GDP), 2019 archive : GDP, volume – annual growth rates in percentage, 2019 
archive.” OECD. 
  34 
Table 1-5: The Effects of the Employment Gap on Economic Performance 
Independent Variable R-squared Value 
Employment Gap — OECD Countries 0.014 
Employment Gap — Pre-2004 EU 0.112*** 
*: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
Figures 10, 11, and 12 depict the relationship between the difference between the 
male and female employment/population ratio. The years covered are 1990, 1995, 2000, 
2005, 2010, and 2015, with only a few data gaps only existing in 1990 and 1995 in some 
of the countries which were not yet OECD members (such as Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Slovenia).  
The r-squared value goes up nearly an entire 0.1 percent between Figures 11 and 
12, and the P-value for the data in Figure 11 is 0.114 while it is 0.002 for Figure 12, a 
large difference that indicates only the data in Figure 12 can be considered statistically 
significant. I believe this discrepancy between OECD results and pre-2004 European 
Union results can be explained by a few factors. First of all, when making the graph for 
Figure 12, I omitted the data for Ireland from 2015. During this year, Ireland had an 
unprecedented growth rate of 25.16, largely due to a heavy inflow of Foreign Direct 
Investment. This means that for this year Ireland’s growth rate was due much more to 
external factors than to internal factors. Therefore, Ireland 2015 is an outlier with the 
potential of skewing the data. The removal of this outlier allows for a more accurate and 
representative correlation. Secondly, the countries which have been in the EU the longest 
are typically also the European countries which have been considered “developed” for the 
longest time as well. This makes them much more likely to have lower GDP growth rates 
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than countries such as those in Eastern Europe. They are also more likely to have had 
relatively stable grow rates during the years present in these graphs.  
Regarding the fact that in Figure 12, the R-squared value is still relatively low at 
0.112, one must consider the number of other factors that affect a country’s GDP growth 
and bear in mind that there is unlikely to be a particularly high correlation between any 
one variable and GDP growth due to all of these compounding variables. These 
compounding variables have been addressed by performing linear regression with a 
number of controls including the following: gross domestic expenditure on Research and 
Development, Gross Capital Formation, and the total employment to population ratio for 
those aged 15 to 64.  
Table 1-6: Hypothesis 2 Regression Results 
variables  Coefficient 
estimate  
Standard 
error 
Coefficient 
estimate  
Standard 
error 
Coefficient 
estimate  
Standard 
error 
Coefficient 
estimate  
Standard 
error 
(Constant) 2.790*** (0.597) 2.705 (3.203) 0.680 (3.528) -4.171 (3.419) 
EmployGap 0.043 (0.043) 0.043 (0.047) 0.037 (0.050) -0.008 (0.047) 
Empl2PopA
LL 
  0.001 (0.043) 0.048 (0.053) 0.021 (0.049) 
ExpRDofGD
P 
    -0.516 (0.408) -0.473 (0.376) 
GCapForm       0.307*** (0.068) 
R-square 0.008 0.008 0.021 0.179 
N 118 117 106 105 
*: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
For all OECD countries overall, only the effect of Gross Capital Development on 
GDP Growth Rate is considered statistically significant. Controlling for all other 
variables, a one unit increase in GDPGrow is associated with a 0.307 unit increase in 
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GCapForm. No other variable’s regression coefficient possesses a low enough P-value to 
be considered statistically significant.  
Accounting for all controls, the regression equation for the effects of women’s 
employment on GDP growth is the following:  
GDPGrow = -4.171 - 0.008*EmployGap + 0.021*Empl2PopALL - 
0.473*ExpRDofGDP + 0.307*GCapForm 
Independent Variable 
EmployGap The difference between the employment/population ratio for males 15 to 64 and the employment/population ratio for females 15 to 64 
Dependent Variable 
GDPGrow Real GDP Growth Rate 
Control Variables 
ExpRDofGDP Gross domestic expenditure on Research and Development as a % of GDP 
GCapForm Gross Capital Formation which includes expenditure on economies fixed assets + net changes in inventory levels. 
Empl2PopALL The total employment/population ratio for males and females aged 15 to 64 
 
Had it followed my hypothesis exactly, this equation would have looked 
something like GDPGRow = β0 - β1*[EmployGap] + β2*[Empl2PopALL] + 
β3*[ExpRDofGDP] + β4*[GCapForm] because I believed that my independent variable 
would show a negative correlation and my control variables would all demonstrate 
positive correlations. Therefore, the actual regression equation mostly matches my 
expectations, other than the negative effect of expenditure on research and development 
on GDP Growth Rate.  
Overview of Results   
 This chapter indicates that within the OECD, social programs can impact 
women’s employment, and an investment in women’s employment can positively impact 
the economy. For many of the variables examined, though, the strongest correlations can 
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be seen when only data from the pre-2004 European Union is used. This could easily be 
due to the fact that examining just these countries indirectly controls for a number of 
factors as the countries in this group are more likely to be socially, economically, and 
politically similar than all of the countries within the OECD. The next chapter will look 
at a series of three country case studies, all of which were members of the EU before 
2004 to continue to control for some of these possible confounding variables, and will 
take a closer look at the specifics of social programs that affect women’s access to the 
workforce and the quality of work that they can pursue.  
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CHAPTER II: WELFARE REGIME CASE STUDIES 
 The following chapter will be more closely examining social programs in place 
that improve women’s access to employment in three countries: Sweden, Ireland, and 
France. Each of these countries represents a different welfare regime as classified by 
sociologist Esping-Andersen. Data used for cross-national comparison was primarily 
obtained from Eurostat and the European Institute for Gender Equality’s Gender Equality 
Index. Specifics relating to the programs in place are described in order to highlight what 
the most effective programs might entail. The aim of these case studies is to illustrate 
three common approaches to implementing social services, specifically to implementing 
social services that ameliorate or prevent factors that commonly bar women from 
pursuing employment, and to demonstrate which of these approaches is most effective. 
Types of Welfare States 
In Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen classifies welfare states 
into three categories: liberal regimes, corporatist regimes, and social democratic regimes. 
For each of these regimes, he lists commonly associated qualities and practices as well as 
the overall perception of and driving-force behind their countries’ welfare states. For this 
chapter, I am analyzing one OECD member country that is an example of each regime in 
order to illustrate the effect of different welfare states – considering their different 
emphases and attitudes – on women’s employment. These countries must also be 
members of the European Union prior to 2004 to ensure that they have consistently been 
in relatively similar levels of development throughout the years included in this time 
series. 
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The “liberal” welfare state is marked by “means-tested assistance, modest 
universal transfers, or modest social-insurance plans,” and its benefits “cater mainly to a 
clientele of low-income, usually working class, state dependents.”56 In these countries, 
welfare is usually still stigmatized, meaning that entitlement rules are strict and benefits 
are usually modest. Instead, the state encourages the market either by only guaranteeing a 
minimum or subsidizing private welfare schemes.57 Examples of this regime include the 
United States, Canada, Australia, and Ireland. 
The “corporatist” welfare state, often referred to by others as conservative 
regimes, is known for promoting a preservation of status differentials by attaching rights 
to class and status. The state mostly takes over from the market as a welfare provider, 
leaving private insurance and occupational fringe benefits with a marginal role. However, 
because of the commitment of these regimes to upholding class differences, their 
redistributive impact is often negligible. Historically, these regimes were often heavily 
influenced by the Church, which led to them also being committed to preserving more 
traditional family structures. Therefore, “social insurance typically excludes non-working 
wives, and family benefits encourage motherhood.”58 Also, “day care, and similar family 
services are conspicuously underdeveloped… [which] serves to emphasize that the state 
will only interfere when the family’s capacity to service its members is exhausted.”59 
Examples include France, Austria, Germany, and Italy. 
                                                
56 Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1991), 26. 
57 Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds, 26-27. 
58 Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds, 27. 
59 Ibid. 
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The third and final regime is the “social democratic” welfare state, which includes 
what are typically known as the Scandinavian countries, such as Norway, Denmark, 
Sweden, and Finland. This regime earned its name because “social democracy was 
clearly the dominant force behind social reform,”60 with these countries pursuing a 
welfare state that promoted a higher standard for equality rather than an equality based on 
minimal needs as was the case with the other regimes. Most importantly, though – as far 
as relevance to this topic – is that this model “preemptively socializes the costs of 
familyhood” by taking a more direct responsibility for caring for children, the elderly, 
and the disabled.61 According to Esping-Andersen, they are “committed to a heavy 
social-service burden… to allow women to choose work rather than the household.”62   
The countries which I have chosen to examine are Ireland (liberal regime), France 
(corporatist), and Sweden (social democratic). These countries were chosen based on an 
examination of the Gender Equality Index, a tool for judging the progress in decreasing 
gender gap within the EU developed by the European Institute for Gender Equality. The 
index gives each country a score between 0 and 100 in categories including power, 
health, knowledge, time, money, and work. The 2019 index was especially pertinent due 
to its stated thematic focus on work-life balance as a measure of gender equality. Sweden 
was chosen due to the fact that it was ranked first by the European Institute for Gender 
Equality in the 2019 Gender Equality Index – in fact it has been ranked first since the 
index was created in 2005. In the 2019 index, France was ranked third, the highest 
                                                
60 Ibid. 
61 Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds, 28. 
62 Ibid. 
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ranking achieved by a corporatist regime, while Ireland was ranked seventh overall.63 
Therefore, France was chosen as the highest ranking corporatist regime, and Ireland was 
chosen as the highest ranking liberal regime within the European Union.64 Each of these 
countries possesses their own unique history related to family-supportive and feminist 
policies which must be examined in order to contextualize where each country is 
currently positioned in these rankings. 
Ireland 
Ireland has a history of being behind other similarly developed nations when it 
comes to female employment supportive policies. In the early 1930s, a “marriage bar” 
was put in place in Ireland, preventing married women from working in the public sector. 
This law was not abolished until 1973, the year that Ireland joined the European Union.65 
While a marriage bar was not unique to Ireland, it was lifted later than those of other 
similarly-developed countries, indicating that Ireland remained behind the times when it 
came to feminist policy. 
 
Ireland has begun to make progress, though, in its general efforts towards gender 
equality. At the time of the first publication of the Gender Equality Index in 2005, Ireland 
was ranked below the overall Europe Union score. As of 2019, however, Ireland occupies 
a rank five places higher than the EU, with its overall score increasing by 9.4 over the 
course of those fourteen years. For comparison, higher-ranked countries such as Denmark 
and Sweden showcase score increases of 2.9 and 4.8, respectively. Ireland’s greatest area 
of growth was within the power category, where their score increased by 21.3 points. 
                                                
63 “Gender Equality Index,” EIGE, European Institute for Gender Equality, accessed on: 21 January 2020. 
64 The United Kingdom was not considered as it is technically no longer a member of the EU. 
65 Pamela Duncan, “Women at Work: 40 years of change” The Irish Times, 8 June 2013.  
  42 
This can be partially credited to the introduction of a 30% legislative candidate quota in 
2012. Such an increase in the share of women represented in legislative assemblies 
allows for women’s issues to occupy a place of importance, likely leading to more 
policies aimed at addressing problems that exclusively or disproportionately affect 
women. Thus, theoretically, one could expect to see an accelerated increase in Ireland’s 
performance in all categories below from 2012 onwards. 
France 
Between the first publication of the Gender Equality Index in 2005 and the most 
recent publication in 2019, France has improved their ranking by four places, now 
occupying third place behind Sweden and Denmark. Like Ireland, their progress in the 
“power” category is particularly notable, with their score increasing between 2005 and 
2019 from 43.6 to 78.3. This 34.7-point jump can be somewhat explained by France’s 
introduction of a 50% legislative quota in 2000 which requires 50/50 representation of 
each sex for political parties’ candidate lists in most elections.66 This was the first 
compulsory gender parity provision at 50 percent in the world, and while there has been 
some pushback, this law has increased the share of women legislators over the last 20 
years.67 More recent amendments to the electoral code now require voters in each canton 
of a department to elect both a male and a female member to departmental councils, 
thereby producing an exact parity between the sexes. As previously mentioned, 
legislative equality is an important factor in the promotion of legislation relating to 
women’s issues. 
                                                
66 “Gender Quotas Database,” International IDEA, Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 
accessed: 9 February 2020. 
67 “Gender Quotas Database.” 
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Sweden 
In 2014, recently elected social democratic Prime Minister Stefan Löfven stated 
his intent to make Sweden the world’s “first feminist government.” On Sweden’s official 
website, the Swedish government today still proudly declares itself to be “a feminist 
government,” and they define the Swedish principle of gender equality as being “that 
everyone, regardless of gender, has the right to work and support themselves, to balance 
career and family life, and to live without the fear of abuse or violence.”68
 
But even before their declaration of commitment to feminist policies, Sweden has 
long been a leader in Europe concerning women’s rights. For example, in 1974 Sweden 
became the first country to allow parents to split what had previously just been termed 
“maternity leave.”69 In 1938, Sweden legalized contraception while it was not legalized 
in France and Ireland until 1967 and 1979, respectively.70 71 In this case of Ireland, this 
was a highly limited legalization, only allowing for contraception of all kinds to be 
dispersed by a pharmacist upon presentation of a prescription written by a doctor.72 It is 
clear that Sweden’s declaration as the world’s “first feminist government” was not a 
moment of radical change, but rather a continuation and expansion of social policy that 
had long been in place. In Changing Welfare States, Anton Hemerijck went so far as to 
state that “a strong and gender-neutral work ethic has always been a bastion of 
Scandinavian social democracy.”73
 
                                                
68 “Sweden and Gender Equality,” sweden.se (Swedish Institute, April 10, 2019). 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 “La contraception en France,” INED, Institut national d’études démographiques, October 2017, 
https://www.ined.fr/fr/tout-savoir-population/memos-demo/focus/contraception-france-2017/. 
72 “Health (Family Planning) Act, 1979,” Electronic Irish Statute Book, Office of the Attorney General,  
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1979/act/20/enacted/en/print. 
73 Anton Hemerijck, Changing Welfare States, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 137. 
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Quality of Women’s Employment 
         Women’s equal access to employment cannot simply be determined by comparing 
the male and female employment rates, as quality of employment cannot be revealed by 
this data. One of the most important factors in determining quality of employment is 
whether a person is engaged in part-time or full-time work. Many women involuntarily 
work part-time, meaning that part-time employment is not a choice that they made based 
upon preference, but rather due to necessity. Women in countries without programs in 
place to ameliorate factors that commonly bar women from entering the workforce, 
particularly care-giving responsibilities, might find themselves unable to reconcile their 
familial obligations with a full-time career. The solution for many of these women who 
either wish to work or who cannot afford to be unemployed is to engage in part-time 
work. Being forced into part-time work has many negative repercussions for women as 
“part-time jobs are often of lower quality with lower hourly wages, provide poorer 
training and career opportunities, and, in the long run, reduce pension entitlements.”74 
While part-time work in general has been increasing in Europe since 2007,75 it still 
remains a heavily gendered occurrence. In 2018, part-time employment as a percentage 
of the total employment for men in the European Union was at 8.7% while for women it 
was 31.3%.76
 
          
  
                                                
74 M. Vaalavuo, “Part-Time Work: A Divided Europe,” European Commission (European Union, April 5, 
2016). 
75 Vaalavuo. 
76 “Part-time employment as percentage of the total employment, by sex, age and citizenship.” Eurostat. 
Luxembourg-Kirchberg: Statistical Office of the European Communities. 
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Figure 13: Women’s Full-Time Equivalent Employment Rate by Country77 
 
         The figure above illustrates the full-time equivalent employment rate for women 
in France, Ireland, and Sweden. The full-time equivalent employment rate is calculated 
by comparing the average number of hours worked by an individual to the average 
number of hours worked by a full-time employee. A full-time worker would count as one 
FTE, while a part-time worker is assigned a proportional number based on the number of 
hours that they work.78 The usage of this unit of measure therefore allows for comparison 
that accounts for vast variations in part-time employment.  
 Variations in part-time employment can provide a glimpse into whether part-time 
employment is a necessity for the women of a certain country, such as those in which the 
cost of un-socialized childcare is too high for women to justify a full-time job, or an 
emancipatory factor that gives women the freedom to pursue employment on their own 
                                                
77 “Gender Equality Index,” EIGE, European Institute for Gender Equality, accessed on: 21 January 2020. 
78 “Full-time equivalent (FTE),” OECD Statistical Glossary. 
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terms by allowing them the flexibility to better divide their time between work and 
familial obligations. Ideally, women (and men) would have the flexibility to schedule the 
exact number of hours that they believe they can work while still fulfilling caregiving 
obligations, rather than having to outright choose between a 20-hour job or a 40-hour job, 
especially considering that part-time work is often associated with lower pay and a lack 
of benefits. This is particularly true in countries with liberal welfare regimes such as 
Ireland where many of the benefits associated with full-time work (retirement funding, 
health insurance, etc.) are socialized to a lesser degree than in countries with social-
democratic and corporatist welfare regimes.  
This graph covers 2005, 2010, 2012, 2015, and 2017 because these were the years 
for which data was available through the Gender Equality Index. While France and 
Ireland have remained close to one another and experienced little change since 2005, 
Sweden has demonstrated both a consistently higher rate and steady growth over the 
years. This is a particularly interesting finding when considering Figure 13 in 
conjunction with Figure 14 below. 
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Figure 14: Women’s Part-Time Employment Rate by Country79 
 
         Figure 14 shows the part-time employment rates of women in France, Ireland, 
and Sweden. These rates show part-time employment as a percentage of the total 
employment in each country for people between the ages of 25 and 54. The age group 25 
to 54 was chosen due to two factors – 1) the more commonly used age group of 15 to 64 
is likely to be skewed since so many teenagers and young adult enter part-time work 
while in school and 2) this age group more closely aligns with prime childbearing and 
childrearing years. The years represented in this graph are all the years for which there 
was available data. 
Figure 14 contrasts with the expectations potentially created by Figure 13, as 
Figure 13 shows the greatest female full-time equivalent employment rate in Sweden, 
and yet Figure 14 shows the highest female part-time employment rate in Sweden. This 
                                                
79 “Part-time employment as percentage of the total employment, by sex, age and citizenship.” Eurostat. 
Luxembourg-Kirchberg: Statistical Office of the European Communities. 
  48 
highlights the fact that within certain societies part-time employment is not necessarily 
indicative of women being pushed into part-time work to balance their career with 
familial obligation, but rather a greater degree of flexibility within their career, a factor 
that will be further discussed below in the section on women’s employment in Sweden. 
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Figure 15: Percentage of Females Who Work Part-Time Due to Caregiving by Country80 
 
Figure 16: Percentage of Males Who Work Part-Time Due to Caregiving by Country81 
 
                                                
80 “Main reason for part-time employment - Distributions by sex and age.” Eurostat. Luxembourg-
Kirchberg: Statistical Office of the European Communities. 
81 “Main reason for part-time employment - Distributions by sex and age.” Eurostat. Luxembourg-
Kirchberg: Statistical Office of the European Communities. 
  50 
Figures 15 and 16 contrast the percentage of males and females who self-
identified their main reason for part-time employment as the need to look after children 
or incapacitated adults. Despite variations, overall a similar percentage of women appear 
to choose to work part-time due to caregiving responsibilities in each of the three 
counties. Between 2006 and 2018, on average 28.9% of women in Ireland, 34.5% of 
women in France, and 27.4% of women in Sweden identified looking after children or 
incapacitated adults as their main reason for working part-time. While women do 
consistently show a much higher rate of choosing to work part-time due to caregiving 
responsibilities, both Ireland and Sweden demonstrate increasing rates of men choosing 
to work part-time in order to be caregivers, while in France the percentage has remained 
steadily between 6.6 and 8.8.         
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Figure 17: Inactive Female Population as a Percentage of Total Female Population by 
Country82 
 
Figure 18: Female Inactive Population Due to Caregiving by Country83 
 
                                                
82 “Inactive population due to caring responsibilities by sex.” Eurostat. Luxembourg-Kirchberg: Statistical 
Office of the European Communities. 
83 Ibid. 
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Figure 17 shows the inactive female population as a percent of the total female 
population ages 20 to 64 while Figure 18 shows the percentage of the inactive female 
population ages 20 to 64 who identified caregiving as the main reason they are not 
actively seeking employment. Members of this group would be considered neither 
employed nor unemployed, but rather outside of the labor force. Therefore, members of 
this group would not have figured into the employment rates in Figure 14 nor the full-
time equivalent employment rates in Figure 13. 
The major jump that can be observed in Ireland could be due to a change in 
sampling that occurred between 2011 and 2012. Ireland introduced a new sample into the 
Labor Force Survey (on which this data is based) following the 2011 census.84 The 
similar, though less extreme, leap that occurred in French data can also be attributed to a 
change in research methods Beginning in 2009, an “old” sample, which was based upon 
the 1999 population census, was gradually replaced by a “new” sample that was selected 
from tax registers. The “old” sample was fully replaced by the fourth quarter of 2011.85 
Therefore, from 2012 onwards, this graph makes an interesting contrast with Figure 15, 
as a significantly larger percentage of women in France and especially in Ireland appear 
to choose to simply not work at all due to caregiving responsibilities than those in 
Sweden.  
  While the graphs above show that Ireland still has progress to make concerning 
gender equality in employment, they also reveal that Ireland has been steadily improving 
in this area over the years as they have experienced the greatest decrease in their inactive 
                                                
84 “Labour force survey in the EU, candidate and EFTA countries: Main characteristics of national surveys, 
2012.” Eurostat. Luxembourg-Kirchberg: Statistical Office of the European Communities, 17. 
85 Labour force survey in the EU,” 22.  
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female population out of these three countries. Much in the same way, though, that 
countries that start with a lower GDP often demonstrate higher growth rates, countries 
like Ireland who have historically been behind other countries in female employment 
quality and equality are more likely to demonstrate faster progress than other countries 
with a much smaller gap to fill.  
         As can be seen in the figures above, trends in women’s employment in France 
tend to represent the middle ground between those of Ireland and Sweden. But in almost 
all of the categories present above, France remains quite stable over the years, seeming to 
indicate a lack of steady, discernible progress. This lack of progress is further echoed by 
the fact that between 2005 and 2019 France’s gender equality index score has only 
increased by 1.9 points while the scores of Ireland and Sweden have improved by 4.4 and 
4.3 points, respectively.86  
         As previously mentioned, the graphs above concerning part-time women’s 
employment show data that seems to defy the expectations that family-supportive 
policies will lead to a lower part-time employment rate. Figure 14 shows that Sweden has 
the highest part-time employment rate for women out of these three countries, yet Figure 
13 shows Sweden to have a significantly higher full-time equivalent employment for 
women than both France and Ireland. This would seem to insinuate that on average 
Swedish women who work part-time work more hours than their Irish and French 
counterparts. According to Figure 17, Sweden also has a significantly smaller inactive 
female population than France and Ireland, and of that population, few women credit 
caregiving as the reason for their inactivity. 
                                                
86 “Gender Equality Index.” 
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         Sweden’s higher female part-time employment rate can be credited to the fact that 
they have made flexible working hours the norm in an effort to encourage work-life 
balance. In 2019, 43.8% of Swedish women and 38.3% of Swedish men reported that 
they were able to adapt their working hours within set limits, in contrast with 19% of 
women and 18.7% of men in the EU. And while 57.3% of women and 54% of men in the 
EU overall stated that their working hours were set by their company with no possibility 
for changes, only 34.6% of Swedish women and 34% of Swedish men reported the 
same.87
 
Childcare 
 
The following graphs compare the hours that children within specific age groups 
spend in formal childcare in Ireland, France, and Sweden. Formal childcare arrangements 
include the following: pre-school education, compulsory education, center-based child 
care services outside of school hours, and daycare center-based childcare. Therefore, this 
data does not account for direct arrangements between parents and caretakers such as 
nannies, babysitters, or relatives.  
  
                                                
87 “Gender Equality Index,” EIGE, European Institute for Gender Equality, accessed on: 21 January 2020. 
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Figure 19: Children Under 3 in 0 Weekly Hours of Childcare by Country88
 
   
Figure 20: Children Under 3 in 30+ Weekly Hours of Childcare by Country89
 
 
                                                
88 “Formal child care by duration and age group.” Eurostat. Luxembourg-Kirchberg: Statistical Office of 
the European Communities. 
89 Ibid. 
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Figure 21: Children 3 to School Aged in 0 Weekly Hours of Childcare by Country90
 
 
Figure 22: Children 3 to School Aged in 30+ Weekly Hours of Childcare by Country91
 
 
                                                
90 “Formal child care by duration and age group.” 
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Figures 19 and 20 show data for children under the age of three, while Figures 21 
and 22 show data from children from age three to the minimum compulsory school age, 
which is six years of age in all three countries.92 Figures 19 and 21 show children in zero 
weekly hours of formal childcare while Figures 20 and 22 show children in 30 or more 
weekly hours of formal childcare to demonstrate two extreme ends of the childcare 
spectrum. Also, theoretically, parents would likely need to be able to place their children 
in 30 or more weekly hours of childcare in order to be able to work full-time jobs.  
Each of these countries remains relatively reliably where one would predict it to 
be in relation to the others due to its type of welfare regime, particularly when looking at 
children in 30 or more hours of formal childcare per week. The graph that shows the least 
apparent division by country is Figure 21, which looks at children from age three to the 
compulsory school age in zero weekly hours of formal childcare. This is likely due to the 
fact that in all three countries, the age at which parents have the right to enroll children in 
early childhood education/care services is either three or younger, meaning that parents in 
these countries have the option of placing their child in formal childcare without 
incurring costs beginning at this age.93  
                                                
92 “Compulsory schooling,” FRA, Vienna: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. 
93 Ibid. 
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Figure 23: Children Under 3 in Zero Weekly Hours of Childcare v. Employment Gap94
 
 
Figure 24: Children 3 to School Age in 0 Weekly Hours of Childcare v. Employment 
Gap95
 
 
                                                
94 “Formal child care by duration and age group.” 
95 Ibid. 
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Figure 25: Children Under 3 in 30+ Weekly Hours of Childcare v. Employment Gap96 
 
Figure 26: Children 3 to School Age in 30+ Weekly Hours of Childcare v. Employment 
Gap97 
 
 
                                                
96 “Formal child care by duration and age group.” 
97 Ibid. 
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Table 2-1: The Effects of Formal Childcare on the Employment Gap between Men and 
Women 
Independent Variable  R-squared Value 
Children Under 3 in Zero Weekly Hours 0.684*** 
Children 3 to School Age in 0 Weekly Hours 0.319*** 
Children Under 3 in 30+ Weekly Hours 0.677*** 
Children 3 to School Age in 30+ Weekly Hours 0.677*** 
*: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
Figures 23, 24, 25, and 26 compare the hours that children within specific age 
groups spend in formal childcare in each country and the difference between male and 
female employment rates in those same countries. Figures 23 and 24 show a comparison 
for children under three and children three to six respectively who are enrolled in zero 
hours of formal childcare weekly. Figures 25 and 26 show a comparison between the 
female employment gap and childcare for children of those same respective age groups 
who are enrolled in 30+ weekly hours of childcare. 
In Figure 23, there is a relatively strong positive correlation between a higher 
employment gap and a higher percentage of children under 3 in zero weekly hours of 
formal childcare. This correlation is less strong in Figure 24, which concerns children 
aged three to six, likely due to the aforementioned fact that children in each of these 
countries have a right to enroll in formal childcare or education beginning at the latest at 
the age of three. This very factor is likely the reason that the range for the percentage of 
children in this age group enrolled in zero weekly hours across all countries’ data was 
19.5, while for children in the younger age group the range of the data was 46. 
In both Figures 25 and 26, a relatively strong negative correlation can be seen 
between the difference between male and female employment rates and the percentage of 
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children in 30+ weekly hours of childcare for both age groups, with each showing over a 
67% correlation. The range of the data for children aged three to six in 30+ weekly hours 
of formal childcare – 64.6 – is much greater than that of similarly aged children in zero 
weekly hours. This indicates a greater variation in behaviors cross-nationally, and likely 
points to the fact that in some countries part-time childcare averaging anywhere between 
1 and 29 hours per week is the most common route. 
As can be seen in Figures 19, 20, 21, and 22 above, young Irish children spend 
much less time in formal childcare than those in France and Sweden. The European 
Commission’s 2018 Report on equality between men and women in the EU found that in 
Ireland “childcare-related net costs represent 33% of disposable income for a couple with 
children with median earnings.”98 This means that in Ireland there is a huge financial 
disincentive for mothers with children to return to work – particularly full-time work – 
after having a child. If the increase in household income will not offset the cost of 
childcare, it would be considered financially inefficient for both members of a couple to 
work. This is more likely to impact women, as the median pay for women in Ireland has 
consistently been below that of men since Eurostat data for median income became 
available in 2008.99 
  In the past, French children had the right to 24 hours of childcare per week 
beginning at the age of three. As of September 2019, all French children are now required 
by law to go to school full-time beginning at this same age. The fact that only part-time 
care is guaranteed can explain why Figure 15 shows a high rate of French women who 
                                                
98 “2018 Report on equality between women and men in the EU,” European Commission. (Luxembourg: 
Publications Office of the European Union: 2018), 14. 
99 “Mean and median income by age and sex.” Eurostat. Luxembourg-Kirchberg: Statistical Office of the 
European Communities. 
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work part-time due to caregiving responsibilities, though this percentage has been 
decreasing over time.100  
 The state partially funds principle childcare services in France, meaning that the 
cost of childcare in France lies somewhere between that in Ireland and Sweden as 
expected due to their regime types. The government is currently seeking to increase the 
number of places available in crèches, early childcare facilities that are famously 
overburdened, particularly in large cities. By 2022, the French government is aiming to 
create 30,000 new spots in crèches.101 
         Swedish policy aims to prompt women to pursue both a career and a family, 
therefore, the government employs generous childcare policies to ensure a high female 
labor force participation and a steady fertility rate. A majority of Swedish children aged 1 
to 5 attend either a private or public preschool. Parents who are either students or 
employees can send their children to preschool for 40 or more hours a week as needed, 
and they typically pay a fee between 1 and 3% of their income. Fees vary depending 
upon the amount of time the child spends at the pre-school and the municipality in which 
they live. Swedish municipalities both receive state grants and tax local income to finance 
these pre-schools.102
 
There exist other forms of child-care, though public preschools are the most 
commonly utilized. Public family day care – attended by approximately 12% of children 
– caters to a small number of children within the provider’s own home. Private day care 
                                                
100 “Country profiles - France: Policies and progress towards investing in children,” European 
Commission, May 2019, accessed on: 3 March 2020. 
101 “Country profiles - France: Policies and progress towards investing in children.” 
102 Mara Westling Allodi, “Child care and pre-schools in sweden: an overview of practice, tendencies and 
research,” Ricerche Di Pedagogia e Didattica vol. 2 (July 7, 2007), 1-2. 
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centers – attended by approximately 13% of children – are run by organizations such as 
churches, but still receive funding from the municipality and must follow the same 
curriculum.103
 
Elderly Care  
One final -- and often overlooked -- area of caregiving that impacts women’s 
employment is that of caring for elderly family members. An important factor that 
determines the dependence of elders upon caregivers is their financial stability, which is 
often indicated by pensions. There are a wide variety of pension schemes present in 
Europe, some mostly privately driven and others more publicly funded. Some aim to 
allow pensioners to all reach a universal basic minimum, others allow them to maintain 
close to their previous standard of living, and many are a hybrid of these two systems. In 
countries where there is a lower basic minimum, the elderly are more dependent upon the 
financial support of working family members. Should these members of the elderly need 
specific caregiving that they are unable to personally afford, their family members must 
either pay for this caregiving or provide this caregiving themselves. Therefore, in 
countries where external elderly caregiving could prove to be a major expense for a 
family, lower-earning family members -- who are typically female -- might elect to not 
work or work part-time in order to provide this care.  
         Ireland’s public pension system pays a flat-rate fee to all who meet minimum 
contribution conditions. State pension is payable beginning at the age of 66, though this 
minimum age will increase to 67 in 2021. Full entitlement to state pension is dependent 
upon the pensioner providing an average of 48 of weeks’ worth of contributions or credits 
                                                
103 Westling Allodi, 2. 
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per year over the course of their working life. Effective March 2018 for those who 
reached pension age after September 1, 2012, pensioners must have provided 40 years of 
contributions to collect the full rate. The state pension as of 2019 was set at 243.30 € per 
week, with an additional 10 € paid to anyone aged 80 or older. There is also a non-
contributory means-tested state pension alternatively available from age 66, with a 
maximum value of 232 € per week. Over half of employees are covered by voluntary 
occupational pension schemes which a contribution rate typically set at 10%.104
 
         Since 1994, public pension entitlement has not been affected by periods outside of 
the labor force due to caregiving responsibilities as long as a minimum of 520 weeks of 
contributions have been paid. As of the introduction of the “total contributions approach” 
in January 2018, a maximum of 20 out of the 40 years required to receive a full-rate state 
pension may be spent caring for children up to 12 years old or caring for a dependent 
adult, such as an elderly family member or a child with a disability.105 
Currently, the French are entitled to a full-rate public pension if they “fulfill either 
both a minimum contributory record (41.5 years for people born in 1957, who can retire 
at the legal age of 62 in 2019) and the minimum legal pension age (62 years for people 
born in 1957) or to be aged at least 67 (for people born in 1957).” The main public 
pension scheme seeks to allow the French to somewhat maintain their standard of living 
after retirement by paying at a rate of 50% for those who worked a full career (currently 
41.5 years). This rate is based upon an average of their 25 highest-earning years, and 
payments cannot exceed 40,524 € annually.106 
                                                
104 “Pensions at a Glance 2019: Country Profile – Ireland.” OECD. 27 November 2019. 
105 Ibid.  
106 “Pensions at a Glance 2019: Country Profile – France.” OECD. 27 November 2019. 
  65 
         Sweden’s “national retirement pension consists of a pay-as-you-go notional 
accounts system and a mandatory funded defined contribution pension and a defined 
benefit pension-income-tested top-up.107 Therefore, this system is targeted at maintaining 
the former living standards (to a point) of pensioners. While earnings-related national 
pensions can be withdrawn beginning at the age of 62 (as of January 2020), the guarantee 
pension benefit, which requires three years’ residency, is available beginning at the age 
of 65. Pension ages are on track to continue increasing to keep up with increasing life 
expectancy and an aging population, hitting 64 by 2026.108 The public pension system 
credits any years in which you have children aged four or below living in your household, 
with the credit going to the parent with the lowest income.109   
Figure 27: Pension Expenditure in PPS per Inhabitant110 
 
                                                
107 “Pensions at a Glance 2019: Country Profile – Sweden.” OECD. 27 November 2019. 
108 “Pensions at a Glance 2019: Country Profile – Sweden.” 
109 Ibid. 
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Figure 27 shows a comparison of pension expenditure in France, Ireland, and 
Sweden using the unit purchasing power standard (PPS) per inhabitant. PPS is a unit of 
measure that accounts for price level differences between countries, meaning that one 
PPS unit would buy the exact same type and quantity of goods in each country. 
Therefore, the use of this unit acts as a control against certain possible confounding 
variables. In a similar way, measuring expenditure per inhabitant eliminates the 
possibility that countries with a larger population overall will automatically appear to 
outspend less populated countries.  
This graph demonstrates that the Irish government distributes far less money to 
pensioners than that of France or Sweden. This is expected as the Irish pension system 
simply aims to supply a universalistic basic income, often supported by additional 
pension contributions through a retiree’s former place of employment. While Ireland is in 
its expected location according to its regime type, Sweden and France appear to be 
reversed, particularly in more recent years when the gap between the two countries 
widens.   
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Figure 28: Pension Expenditure v. The Employment Gap111 
 
Table 2-1: The Effects of Formal Childcare on the Employment Gap between Men and 
Women 
 
Independent Variable  R-squared Value 
Pension Expenditure in PPS per inhabitant 0.468*** 
*: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
 Figure 28 illustrates the negative correlation between pension expenditure and the 
employment gap between men and women while Table 2-1 ensures the significance of 
this correlation. There clearly exists a relationship between the two, a relationship that is 
even stronger than that between the employment gap and children aged 3 to school age 
who are in zero weekly hours of formal childcare for which the R-squared value was 
0.319. This highlights the fact that elder care cannot be overlooked as a factor that 
impacts women’s employment.  
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Overview of Results 
In general, each of these countries follows the patterns expected of them based 
upon their welfare regime. Sweden, the social democratic regime, demonstrates a much 
greater commitment to feminist policy and enabling women to join the labor force than 
France or Ireland. France, the corporatist regime, tends to show results somewhere 
between those of Sweden and Ireland, the liberal regime, though its data is often much 
closer to that of Sweden than to that of Ireland. Ireland, despite its comparatively worse 
performance, does seem to be steadily improving in several categories while France 
frequently remains stagnant. These countries clearly indicate the importance of social 
programs in allowing caregivers to be active within the labor force. These graphs also do 
indicate that in general progress has continued to be made within the last 15 to 25 years.  
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CONCLUSION 
 Clearly, legislation and welfare that affects caregiving responsibilities also 
directly affects female employment, especially caregiving related to children as is 
indicated by the statistically significant correlations between maternity leave and the 
employment gap as well as between expenditure on families and the employment gap. 
This is further supported by the case studies, which show that countries like France and 
Sweden that possess more programs aimed at, in the words of Esping-Andersen, de-
familializing, show both smaller employment gaps and generally higher quality of work 
for women.  Sweden, which possesses that policies that best support female employment, 
demonstrates two qualities that I think are essential in encouraging women’s 
employment: 1) flexibility in working hours and 2) division of care labor.  
The first, flexibility, allows women to work in jobs that are as close to full-time 
work as they are able to work. For example, some mothers might find it difficult to work 
in the late afternoons when their children are released from school. In an environment 
where flexible working hours are encouraged, these mothers might be able to work 32-
hour work weeks to allow them to be free before the evening. In an inflexible 
environment, these mothers might have to choose between working 20 hours part-time or 
working 40 hours and making other arrangements for their children to be taken home 
from school.  
The second quality, division of care labor, relates to Sweden’s perception of 
gendered care-giving responsibilities. Care-giving is more equally (though not perfectly 
equally) divide between mothers and fathers in Sweden, freeing up more of the mother’s 
time to be able to work outside of the home. Since 2014, Sweden has possessed the 
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lowest percentage of women who work part-time due to caregiving responsibilities out of 
these three countries, and consistently throughout all years of available data they have 
simultaneously possessed the highest percentage of males who work part-time due to 
caregiving responsibilities. Swedish parental leave policies also encourage men to 
participate in caregiving by allocating a paternity leave to men on non-transferable, use-
it-or-lose-it basis.  
Finally, the question as to whether or not a smaller employment gap between men 
and women improves the economy remains challenging to answer. In the OECD 
countries overall, there was little correlation and the results were not considered 
statistically significant. However, when looking at only the countries in the European 
Union before 2004,112 there is a correlation that is both statistically significant and 
relatively high considering the number of factors that impact GDP Growth Rate. Because 
the countries in the EU before 2004 would be more likely to be a group with similar 
economic, social, and political history and conditions, the data from these countries could 
be considered to be better controlled than that from all the developed countries of the 
OECD. Therefore, it can be assumed that a smaller employment gap could encourage a 
better performing economy.  
Nevertheless, if there was no correlation between women’s employment and 
economic performance, there would remain any number of factors that indicate the 
importance of legislation that allows women to pursue work outside of the home. 
Economically, women being tied to the home, especially women who the state has 
invested in by paying for their education, is a waste of human capital. Politically, a lower 
                                                
112 Excluding Greece 
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rate of women in the workforce could lower tax revenue. And socially and morally, no 
group should feel barred, even indirectly, from pursuing their ambitions simply on the 
basis of sex.  
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